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The mutual fund industry has attracted 
widespread media attention in recent 
months. A day rarely passes without 
a story about alleged fund misdeeds 
or proposed remedies. The breadth of 
the scandal raises a serious question 
about the need for actions that might 
strengthen and protect the public’s 
trust in the integrity of mutual funds. 
In light of these concerns, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and Con-
gress are considering remedies aimed at 
reducing the likelihood of future abuses. 
The scandal has also brought scrutiny 
to fund fees and costs, raising questions 
about the adequacy of competition as 
a disciplinary force. Federal Reserve 
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan and 
Treasury Secretary John Snow pointed 
to this concern when they urged legisla-
tors, as they consider possible reforms, 
to “make sure that the fees associated 
with mutual funds are subject to com-
petitive tests of the market place.” The 
issue centers on whether the rules gov-
erning fee disclosure ensure that mutual 
fund fees are exposed to these tests.
One reason the mutual fund market 
may not be adequately competitive is 
that not all investors have what would 
be considered “sufﬁ  cient” information, 
and such a deﬁ  ciency can result in un-
desirable outcomes, like some inves-
tors paying more for identical products. 
Changes imposed on the mutual fund 
marketplace need to address this infor-
mation deﬁ  ciency, and new rules for 
improved disclosure are a step in the 
right direction.
   Mutual Fund Basics
Mutual funds are investment compa-
nies that collect savings from many 
individual investors and invest those 
savings in a wide range of ﬁ  nancial 
assets or securities. The funds’ pooling 
of individual savings makes it possible 
for small investors to obtain fraction-
al shares of many different securities 
and thereby enables them to gain the 
beneﬁ  ts of diversiﬁ  cation and lower 
transaction costs. For households with 
limited wealth, mutual funds provide 
one of the only practical means to own 
a diversiﬁ  ed portfolio of stocks and 
bonds. It is well established that own-
ing such a portfolio provides signiﬁ  -
cant advantages for building a retire-
ment nest egg. 
Mutual funds come in many varieties. 
For, example, there are mutual funds 
for stocks, bonds, money market instru-
ments, and combinations of them—
commonly called hybrids. Many vari-
eties exist within these general classes. 
Some stock funds, for example, invest 
broadly in an effort to produce yields 
close to market indexes, such as the 
S&P 500 or the Wilshire 5000. Others 
differentiate according to prespeciﬁ  ed 
investment criteria such as size (large, 
medium, or small ﬁ  rms), and style (val-
ue, growth, or blend). Moreover, some 
funds specialize in sectors of the econ-
omy, such as information technology or 
biomedicine, while others may invest in 
international portfolios. 
When held over long periods of time, 
broad portfolios of stocks and bonds 
have produced returns that substantially 
exceed the interest rate paid on less risky 
assets such as short-term U.S. Treasury 
bills or bank deposits. So, to the extent 
that mutual funds have made it possible 
for the small investor to participate in 
the stock and bond markets, they have 
enabled small investors—in principle 
at least—to earn higher returns on their 
savings. 
The virtues of mutual funds have 
become widely recognized, with house-
hold participation increasing dramati-
cally over the last 25 years. Fund assets 
have increased from less than $1 tril-
lion in 1980 to more than $7 trillion to-
day. Stock funds currently account for 
about $3.5 trillion—or half the value of 
all funds. The sheer magnitude of these 
numbers suggests that the ongoing reas-
sessment of the adequacy of market dis-
cipline is no small matter.
Mutual funds enable small, less 
experienced investors to hold diversi-
ﬁ  ed portfolios of stocks and bonds 
at relatively low costs. Though the 
mutual fund market is competi-
tive in many ways, fees can vary 
substantially for what are essentially 
identical products. This may be due 
to bundling of services, but it may 
also reﬂ  ect some confusion on the 
part of less experienced investors, 
which inhibits comparative shopping 
among funds. Suggested reforms for 
improved fee disclosure seek to make 
fees more transparent for less in-
formed investors and should improve 
competitive discipline among funds.   Elements of Competition
Highly competitive markets are gen-
erally characterized by four basic 
elements: First, they often have many 
buyers and sellers. Having many 
participants reduces the power of 
anyone (buyer or seller) to dictate his 
own price. Second, no barriers prevent 
buyers or sellers from freely entering 
or exiting the market. The openness of 
a market to newcomers provides a 
potential threat of competitive dis-
cipline, even in situations where the 
number of buyers and sellers may be 
limited. Third, a standard good is sold. 
This allows buyers to make what are 
commonly called apples-to-apples 
comparisons. And fourth, buyers have 
sufﬁ  cient information about the goods 
sold to determine their relative worth. 
Markets for commodities such as wheat 
are often cited as an example of markets 
with these characteristics. Because the 
wheat market is competitive, buyers can 
expect to pay a competitive price when 
purchasing a bushel of wheat. More-
over, the price will be the same for all 
buyers and sellers in that market. This is 
the law of one price, and it is a hallmark 
of highly competitive markets. 
The mutual fund market clearly exhib-
its the ﬁ  rst two characteristics. There 
are thousands of mutual funds for sale 
and tens of millions of households that 
buy them. New funds are launched al-
most daily. 
A little less obvious is that all of these 
funds provide a standard product. De-
spite the variety of mutual funds, each 
category typically has a reasonably 
standardized benchmark. In its annual 
review of mutual funds, for instance, 
Money magazine identiﬁ  es 41 distinct 
peer groups for stocks and 55 for bond 
funds. Mutual fund investors can thus 
compare fund performance and costs 
within peer groups. Within these groups 
mutual funds are reasonably homoge-
neous. Importantly, each peer group 
typically has many buyers and sellers 
and free entry of new sellers. 
Where the mutual fund market may de-
viate from the competitive paradigm 
is in terms of the fourth characteris-
tic—sufﬁ  ciently informed buyers. With 
mutual funds, investors often lack in-
formation the fund managers have. This 
information gap is inherent in the nature 
of the mutual fund industry. Investors 
rely on the fund manager to make deci-
sions that are in their best interest, but 
their ability to monitor whether the fund 
is performing as well as the competi-
tion is limited. Even investors who have 
the means to monitor fund performance 
may choose not to if the costs exceed 
the expected beneﬁ  ts. 
   Do Investors Have 
Sufﬁ  cient Information?
Investors as a rule have less information 
than fund managers, but whether they 
have what they need to understand the 
differences among funds, and thus what 
they should be willing to pay for them, 
is subject to debate. The evidence tends 
to support the view that some investors 
are not as informed as they should be 
when it comes to mutual funds, espe-
cially where fees are concerned. 
S&P 500 index funds offer one of the 
simplest vehicles for addressing this 
question. Like any index fund, an S&P 
500 index fund buys shares of securi-
ties in proportion to the securities’ rep-
resentation in the index being tracked. 
Because the S&P 500 index is value 
weighted, a fund tracking it buys shares 
in each S&P 500 company in proportion 
to that ﬁ  rm’s outstanding equity value. 
Transaction costs are limited, because as 
the fund grows, the fund manager rarely 
sells stock. Index funds are thus one of 
the lowest-cost ways for small investors 
to participate in the stock market.
Of all types of mutual funds, an S&P 
500 index fund is perhaps most like a 
pure standard good. Returns on differ-
ent funds’ portfolios are virtually identi-
cal. Moreover, because these funds hold 
the same securities in the same propor-
tions, their risk characteristics are essen-
tially identical. If this market is compet-
itive, fees should be low and about the 
same for all funds in the market. For the 
most part, the S&P 500 index fund mar-
ket is dominated by a few low-cost, low-
turnover funds that consistently produce 
returns closely in line with the index—a 
result one expects from a highly compet-
itive market. 
But according to a recent study,1 the 
market also supports a number of funds 
that persistently yield less than their 
peers. Moreover, the study demon-
strates that expenses are the key deter-
minant in overall fund performance. In 
fact, the gross returns on portfolios held 
by funds are virtually identical as ex-
pected, but the added costs associated 
with higher expense ratios—the ratio 
of fees to assets—reduce net returns 
by a like amount. Although it is easy 
to identify which S&P 500 funds have 
high costs and are thus likely to exhibit 
poor performance, the high-cost funds 
persist and even grow—an outcome not 
consistent with the competitive market 
paradigm. 
It might seem puzzling that investors in 
an S&P 500 fund could be uninformed 
about the fund’s costs or investment 
performance. Current regulations re-
quire that expense ratios be prominently 
displayed in a fund’s prospectus. More-
over, other costs not associated with 
fees are usually small for an index fund 
and do not materially affect a fund’s rel-
ative performance.
While the study’s authors view the ex-
istence of persistent performance differ-
entials in S&P index funds as evidence 
that some investors are uninformed, an-
other explanation is possible. Investors 
might hold persistently lower-yielding 
funds because they are bundled with 
other services from a broker or ﬁ  nancial 
advisor. For example, the ﬁ  nancial advi-
sor might answer questions and give ad-
vice without charge—a service of value 
to the small investor. In such a case, in-
vestors are paying for the extra value. 
The terms of these sorts of arrange-
ments are not easily observed, and it 
would take some investigation to deter-
mine whether they existed. But while 
we don’t have data to refute that expla-
nation, results from surveys on ﬁ  nan-
cial literacy suggest many investors do 
not fully understand the implications of 
alternative fee structures in the format 
they are currently disclosed.2 
   Improving Fee Disclosure
If investors are confused about mutual 
fund fees, it’s not too hard to see why. 
The range of alternative fee structures 
is wide, and the way fees are disclosed 
makes comparison difﬁ  cult. Fees that 
appear in expense ratios are of two 
types, operating expenses and distribu-
tion fees. Neither operating expenses 
nor distribution fees are explicitly billed 
to the investor. Rather, they are deduct-
ed from fund assets, as are brokerage 
fees incurred in managing the portfolio. 
Thus, they reduce returns by an equal 
percentage amount.
Operating expenses include fund ad-
ministration, shareholder servicing, and 
investment management. In the case 
of index funds, investment manage-
ment is minimal. Distribution fees have 
been permitted since 1980 under what 
is known as Rule 12b-1. Before 12b-1 
fees, all funds were sold through bro-
kers and carried one-time sales charges FIGURE 1 DOLLAR COST IMPLICATIONS OF 
ALTERNATIVE FEE STRUCTURES
known as front-end loads. These loads 
were paid by the investor to broker-
ages at the point of sale. The 12b-1 rule 
enabled the creation of a new share 
class, which could be sold by a mutual 
fund directly to investors with no load. 
(Many funds still charged redemption 
fees, though—also called back-end 
loads—for shares redeemed before a 
speciﬁ  ed period.) Unlike loads, 12b-1 
fees are paid out of fund assets and re-
duce investor returns. More signiﬁ  cantly, 
they are ongoing. 
The 12b-1 fee was intended as a tempo-
rary measure to allow funds to recoup 
marketing and advertising costs associ-
ated with launching the new share class. 
Today, 12b-1 fees are a common com-
ponent of the expenses for many funds 
and are largely used to pay for the sale 
of fund shares through brokers and 
ﬁ  nancial advisors. 
After the introduction of 12b-1 fees, 
mutual funds began to offer different 
classes of shares for the same fund. 
One class might, for instance, involve 
a front-end load but no 12b-1 fee. An-
other may have no front-end load but 
impose 12b-1 fees and have redemption 
fees that diminish to zero over ﬁ  ve-year 
periods. Other classes of shares have 
combinations of loads and 12b-1 fees. It 
seems apparent that even sophisticated 
investors may become bewildered by 
the choice of share class.
The SEC and Congress are proposing to 
standardize disclosure of fees and loads 
in terms of the dollar cost for a given 
initial investment over comparable 
holding periods. Surveys suggest inves-
tors ﬁ  nd it easier to make comparisons 
between funds if costs are disclosed in 
this way. To appreciate how dollar cost 
comparisons simplify the choice inves-
tors face, consider ﬁ  gure 1. Figure 1 il-
lustrates the dollar-cost-based format 
in terms of cumulative returns on three 
different S&P 500 index funds. It as-
sumes an initial investment of $10,000 
and a steady portfolio return of 7 per-
cent per year (before costs). Fund A has 
neither a load nor a 12b-1 fee and has 
very low operating expenses—a fee 
structure similar to the large, dominant 
index funds in the market. Fund B has a 
high front-end load but a moderate ex-
pense ratio. Fund C has a small load but 
a high expense ratio, which includes a 
12b-1 fee. Though the differences seem 
small, their cumulative impact can be 
substantial over one’s lifetime.
The comparison also demonstrates the 
pernicious effect that high 12b-1 fees 
would have for an investor who choos-
es to hold Fund C over a long period. 
Though the front-end load is smaller 
than that of Fund B, the recurring nature 
of the 12b-1 fee is ampliﬁ  ed through a 
compounding effect. 
The SEC is currently seeking comments 
on the need for additional changes to 
Rule 12b-1. Speciﬁ  cally, it seeks com-
ments on whether distribution costs 
should be deducted directly from share-
holder accounts rather than from fund 
assets. This would make distribution 
costs more transparent in that the cost 
would appear in each shareholder state-
ment. At the request of SEC chairman 
William Donaldson, the proposal will 
also seek comments on whether Rule 
12b-1 should be abolished altogether. 
This would effectively eliminate share 
classes and force funds to compete on 
loads, which are much easier to under-
stand. 
   Problem Solved?
Perhaps the most important virtue of 
mutual funds is that they enable small, 
less experienced investors to hold diver-
siﬁ  ed portfolios of stocks and bonds at 
relatively low cost. Recent investor sur-
veys suggest, however, that mutual fund 
fees may not be disclosed in a format 
that easily allows novice investors to 
do comparative shopping among funds. 
Many of the proposals for improved 
disclosure—some already implement-
ed—go far in making fees more trans-
parent for less informed investors and 
hence will likely improve competitive 
discipline among mutual funds. 
It is unclear whether improvements 
to disclosure rules alone can solve the 
problem in a cost effective way. Chair-
man Greenspan and Treasury secretary 
Snow also urged Congress to measure 
the beneﬁ  ts of any proposed change 
against its costs. It seems that there will 
be a continuing need for improved 
ﬁ  nancial education among households 
and that such education must come 
from other sources. Hopefully, this 
Economic Commentary is a contribu-
tion toward this end.
   Footnotes
1. Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber, 
and Jeffrey A. Busse. 2004. “Are Inves-
tors Rational?” Journal of Finance 59:
1, 261–88.
2. The study by Elton, Gruber, and 
Bosse also points to the absence of any 
mechanism for arbitrage as an impor-
tant reason high-cost funds may persist. 
Hence, uniformed investors do not ben-
eﬁ  t from the existence of sophisticated 
investors. In the case of mutual funds, 
the only thing a well-informed investor 
can do is buy the high-performing funds 
and avoid the poorly performing ones. 
To distinguish the two, every investor 
has to be informed.
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Initial investment $10,000 $10,000 $10,000
5 years  $13,908 $13,023 $12,939
10 years $19,343 $17,759 $16,911
25 years $52,037 $45,034 $37,753
Notes: a. With no load, 0.18 percent expense ratio. b. With 4.5 percent front-end 
load, 0.6 percent expense ratio. c. With 1 percent front-end load, 1.5 percent expense 
ratio, including 0.65 percent 12b-1 fee.
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